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The Control of the Voir Dire Examination
By HONORABr. CAmms J. McGounicK*f
THE TRIAL courts have for many years been plagued by the prob-
lem of controlling the voir dire examination of jurors. The essence of
this problem is the limiting, as much as possible, of the time consumed
by the proceeding; for it is the duty of the trial court to expedite the
trial. More precisely, the question becomes that of how far the court
may limit the examination of jurors by counsel, and in what manner
it may itself take measures to speed up the proceeding.
There are three areas in which the court may so act: it may refuse
to allow examination designed solely to lay a basis for a peremptory
challenge; it may prevent the conditioning of jurors on matters per-
taining to law; and it may itself take over much of the examination
proper.
Examination for Peremptory Challenges
It is well settled that counsel may not ask questions of jurors solely
for the purpose of determining whether to make a peremptory chal-
lenge. This rule was first laid down sixty years ago in the case of
People v. Edwards,' at least as to criminal cases. The court denounced
this method of questioning, saying: 2
The records of the cases appealed to this court in which rulings
made while impanelling a jury have been involved, indicate that
there is an increasing tendency to prolong the proceedings inordi-
nately by allowing counsel on either side to indulge in tedious exam-
ination of jurors, apparently with no definite purpose or object in
view, but with the hope of eliciting something indicating the advis-
ability of a peremptory challenge, and that the supposed privilege of
doing this has been greatly abused.
* LL.B., University of San Francisco, 1929; Presiding Judge, Superior Court, Sonoma
County.
t The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance given him in the prep-
aration of this article by Errol Tyler, member, third year class, Hastings College of the
Law.
1 163 Cal. 752, 127 Pac. 58 (1912).
2 Id. at 753, 127 Pac. at 58.
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The court reasoned that no authorization for such examination was to
be found in the Penal Code. Under the Code, challenges are divided
into two classes: for cause and peremptory." A peremptory challenge
is defined as "an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given,
but upon which the court must exclude hdm." 4 So no issue of fact can
possibly arise with regard to the reasons for such challenge. The Code
then defines the several kinds of challenges for cause and prescribes
the mode of forming issues of fact as to the grounds on which they may
be predicated,5 and provides for the manner of trying such issues of
fact.6 The court concluded that these provisions, taken with that
which provides that peremptory challenges are to be taken after chal-
lenges for cause are exhausted,- do not relate to or authorize the exam-
ination of a juror for the purpose of enabling the parties independently
to determine whether or not a peremptory challenge should be taken.
The Edwards case has been followed in a steady line of decisions
up to the present day. The latest expression of the rule is found in
People v. Rigney.8 In this case, the trial court conducted an elaborate
voir dire examination and then allowed each party to examine the
prospective jurors. Defense counsel attempted to ask the jurors the
branch of military service with which they had been affiliated, whether
the defendant would be prejudiced by reason of the fact there was a
"divorce in this case," and whether any of the jurors were related to a
law enforcement officer. The court refused to permit these questions
on the ground that they were asked to obtain information for peremp-
tory challenges. This refusal was upheld by the Supreme Court, which
applied the Edwards rule. The court also indicated that if counsel's
questions were also designed to lay a basis for a challenge for cause
the refusal would not have been justified, stating that ". . . if special
circumstances in the present case made defendant's questions relevant
to show bias or other grounds for a challenge for cause he should have
informed the court of his reasons for asking the questions."9
In civil cases the rule was first applied in Zolkover v. Pacific Elec.
Ry. 1° Here the court stated that there was no error in limiting plain-
tiff's voir dire examination of jurors where his questions were not pro-
pounded for the purpose of laying the foundation of a challenge for
cause, but were asked simply for the purpose of enabling him to deter-
3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1067.
4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1069.
r CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1071-78.
6 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1081-83.
7 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1088.
8 55 Cal. 2d 236, 10 Cal. Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23 (1961).
9 Id. at 244, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 629, 359 P.2d at 27.
10 81 Cal. App. 772, 254 Pac. 926 (1927).
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mine whether he would or would not desire to exercise peremptory
challenges. Interestingly enough, the court cited as authority the Ed-
wards case without comment.
Matters Pertaining to Law
Very often counsel will ask prospective jurors if they will apply
certain instructions pertaining to the law of the case. It has always
been my opinion that knowledge of the law is not one of the qualifi-
cations for jury duty and that it is not the province of counsel on voir
dire to attempt to instruct the jurors on matters of law. Rather, it is
the duty of the court to instruct jurors on the law, and it is also the
duty of the judge to expedite the trial and to restrict the examination
of jurors within reasonable grounds. The Supreme Court, in stating
this view, said: "The knowledge or ignorance of prospective jurors con-
cerning questions of law is generally not a proper subject of inquiry
on voir dire, for it is presumed that jurors will be adequately informed
as to the applicable law by the instructions of the court.-"
It must be borne in mind, however, that in capital cases counsel
for defendant has the right to question prospective jurors for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether any would vote to impose the death pen-
alty without regard to the evidence in the event of conviction. The
rule, stated in People v. Hughes, is: 12
In order to intelligently exercise the right to challenge for cause
prospective jurors who have fixed opinions with regard to infliction of
the death penalty, defendant's counsel must be accorded reasonable
opportunity to lay a foundation for the challenge by questioning such
jurors on voir dire to learn whether any entertain a fixed opinion of
this nature.
Suggested Procedure
The third, and most effective, method of expediting the voir dire
examination is the conducting of a major part of the examination by
the court. A suggested procedure is as follows:
When twelve prospective jurors have been seated in the jury box,
the court will first outline the nature of the case and give a resum6 of
the pleadings. Then the duties of the jurors are outlined: they should be
cautioned to truthfully answer all questions propounded by the court
and counsel touching upon their qualifications to act as jurors; and
informed that they must be open-minded, that they must not discuss
the case until it is submitted to them, that they are the sole judges of
the facts and credibility of the witnesses, and that they must accept
"1 People v. Love, 53 Cal. 2d 843, 3 Cal. Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705 (1960).
12 People v. Hughes, 57 Cal. 2d -, 17 Cal. Rptr. 617, 620, 367 P.2d 33, 36 (1961).
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the law from the court and apply it to the facts of the case in arriving
at their conclusion.
Following this general outline, the court should then conduct a
general examination of the jurors. The nature of this examination
should be somewhat as follows:
The jurors' knowledge of the case.
Relation to the litigants or their immediate families.
If a corporation is a party, whether they are related to an officer;
whether they are stockholders, debtors or creditors; whether they
know the attorneys or their associates.
Prior jury service.
Whether they have been a juror or a witness in a case of a similar
nature.
If the case is an accident case, they should be interrogated as to
whether they or members of their families have been involved in an
accident, whether they suffered serious or nominal damages, whether
litigation resulted from the accident, whether they drive an automo-
bile, and the like.
Do they have any bias or prejudice against tls type of case.
In connection with the subject matter of damages, will they apply
the rule of reasonableness.
Whether they can be fair and impartial in connection with the
case, giving each side fair consideration.
Whether they are willing to try the case upon the facts and law
presented in this case to the exclusion of all others.
Whether they have any preconceived notions or opinions concern-
ing this type of case that would prevent them from giving both sides
equal status from beginning to end.
Counsel should then be interrogated as to whether they are willing
to furnish the names of their witnesses, expert or otherwise, so that the
jurors may be questioned as to whether they have any acquaintance
with them and, if so, whether that f ct will influence their decision.
Whether they have any religious conviction that would prevent
them from evaluating pain and suffering in personal injury cases.
Finally, counsel should be asked if they wish the jurors to be in-
formed in a general or preliminary way as to matters of law. If so,
counsel will request the court to do so; and to the extent that the court
deems it proper to so instruct or inform at this stage of the proceeding
it will do so.
Counsel then should be admonished to refrain from educating, in-
structing, or questioning the jurors on matters pertaining to law.
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Then, to eliminate counsel's questioning on these subjects, the
court should have each juror rise, state his name, residence, occupa-
tion, marital status and occupation of spouse.
When the above items have all been disposed of, counsel may be
permitted to examine the jurors on any matter, not covered by the
court's examination, touching upon the jurors' disqualification for
cause.
It is suggested that counsel be informed at the pre-trial conference
that the examination of jurors will be conducted in this manner, so
that they are not taken by surprise on the date of trial and subject to
admonishment concerning their conduct in this regard. If a different
attorney from the one who appeared at pretrial conference is sent into
court to try the case, a short conference before the trial with him will
suffice to alert him of what to expect in connection with the exami-
nation.
The court, then, is in a position to most adequately control the
examination of jurors with the tools and methods which have been
discussed. It has been my experience that when the type of voir dire
examination indicated is used, the time required in selecting the jury
is reduced by at least one half-a very substantial saving.
May, 1962] VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
